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Assn. of Justice Counsel:
The Section 7 Liberty Interest in
the Context of Employment
Hamish Stewart

I. INTRODUCTION
Assn. of Justice Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General)1 is a labour
arbitration case. An employer issued a directive requiring employees to be
available for overtime work. The union argued that the directive was not a
proper exercise of a management rights clause in a collective agreement. But
the employer was the government, and the collective agreement also
contained a clause forbidding the employer to violate employees’ Charter
rights.2 And so the union also argued that the directive violated the
employees’ rights under section 7 of the Charter. An adjudicator agreed with
the union on both grounds. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the
adjudicator’s decision as to management rights was reasonable, but rejected
the union’s constitutional argument on the ground that the directive did not
affect the employees’ section 7 right to liberty. It was therefore unnecessary
to consider whether it was consistent with the principles of fundamental
justice. In my view, this constitutional holding was probably wrong.
Requiring someone to be somewhere at a particular time does affect the
liberty interest, both in itself and, if sufficiently demanding of a person’s
time, through its impact on fundamental personal choices. The Court’s
reluctance to recognize these points may unnecessarily impede the continued
development of the section 7 liberty interest. Moreover, the constitutional

Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am very grateful to Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin
Berger for the invitation to speak at the 2018 Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference, to Brian Langille
for a helpful conversation, to Sonia Lawrence and two anonymous readers for comments on a draft, and to
James Schneider for a very useful and engaging research memorandum.
1
[2017] S.C.J. No. 55, 2017 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Assn. of Justice Counsel”], varg
[2016] F.C.J. No. 204, 2016 FCA 92 (F.C.A.), which allowed the employer’s application for judicial
review of the adjudicator’s decision, 2015 PSLREB 31 [hereinafter “Decision”].
2
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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holding is inconsistent with the Court’s determination that the adjudicator’s
decision was reasonable. On the facts of Assn. of Justice Counsel, if
section 7 of the Charter applied at all, the constitutional issue and the issue
of interpreting the collective agreement were essentially the same and should
have been resolved the same way.

II. OVERVIEW
Lawyers working in the Quebec office of the Immigration Law
Directorate of the federal Department of Justice were, from time to time,
required to work outside regular hours to deal with urgent matters. Until
2010, the office used a system whereby lawyers would volunteer to be on
standby and would be compensated with paid time off, whether or not
any matters actually arose requiring their attention. In March 2010, the
Director of the Quebec office changed the standby system so that lawyers
on standby would be paid only if their services were actually required.
After that, there were no more volunteers. So, in April 2010, the Director
issued a directive requiring all lawyers in the office to be available for
standby duty, on a rotational basis. The result was that each lawyer was
required to be on standby one to three weeks per year.3 The Court
described standby duty as follows:
The standby period is from 5:00-9:00 p.m. on weekdays and from
9:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m. on weekends. While on standby, the lawyers need to
be ready to prepare and argue possible stay applications on short notice.
They must carry an employer-issued pager and cell phone and be able
to reach their office within approximately one hour if called.4

The lawyers’ union grieved the directive. The collective agreement did
not speak explicitly to the issue of standby duty, but it did contain
standard clauses preserving management rights and requiring the
employer to administer the agreement reasonably. The adjudicator held
that the directive was not a reasonable exercise of the employer’s
management rights. The Federal Court of Appeal held that the
adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Canada,
by a 7-2 majority, reversed the Court of Appeal on this point and held
that the adjudicator’s decision was reasonable.
3
This summary is based on Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at paras. 4-8 and the
Decision, supra, note 1, at para. 7.
4
Assn. of Justice Counsel, id., at para. 7.
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But there was an additional element to the grievance. The collective
agreement provided that nothing in it “shall be construed as an
abridgment or restriction of any lawyer’s constitutional rights …”. The
union argued that the directive also violated that provision, specifically
that it violated section 7 of the Charter. To demonstrate a violation of
section 7, a Charter applicant has to show that the government action in
question affects their “life, liberty or security of the person” and that the
effect on life, liberty or security is not “in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.”5 As noted, the directive required the lawyers to
be on call at certain times, and a lawyer on call was required to “be able
to reach their office within approximately an hour if called.”6 The
adjudicator held that the section 7 liberty interest included “the right to
enjoy a private life outside the workplace and outside normal work
hours”.7 On that basis, he concluded that the directive engaged section 7.
The adjudicator further held that the directive did not comply with the
principles of fundamental justice because its deleterious effect on the
liberty interest was “completely disproportionate to its objective”, in that
there were other ways that the employer could have structured the on-call
system that would have affected the liberty interest less.8
The Federal Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada both
held that the directive did not even engage section 7 (and that it was
therefore unnecessary to consider whether it complied with the principles
of fundamental justice). The Supreme Court of Canada first hinted that
section 7 might not apply at all, but went on to say that even if section 7
did apply, it was not engaged. The Court has recognized that the
section 7 liberty interest protects certain fundamental personal
decisions;9 but it has not extended that idea to cover every decision that
any individual happens to consider important. The Court understood the
union’s claim as an attempt to do just that, and rejected it on the ground

5
On s. 7 generally, see Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012)
[hereinafter “Stewart, Fundamental Justice”].
6
Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 7.
7
Decision, supra, note 1, at para. 60.
8
Decision, id., at para. 65.
9
Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 49, citing R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 79, 2003 SCC 74 (S.C.C.), where the interest in question was not recognized; and Godbout v.
Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (S.C.C.), where the interest was recognized,
though not by a clear majority of the Court. Strangely, the Court did not mention Carter v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, 2015 SCC 5 (S.C.C.), where the Court unanimously recognized a
decision of fundamental personal importance as engaging the s. 7 liberty interest.
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that the directive did not affect the employees’ control over fundamental
personal choices:
… not all activities that an individual happens to define as central to his
or her lifestyle are protected by s. 7. … By analogy, the ability of the
lawyers — for two to three weeks per year — to attend opera or piano
lessons, or to train for a triathlon without having to keep a pager nearby
are not protected by s. 7.
… the directive requires them, as a condition of employment, to be
potentially less available to their family for, at most, two to three weeks
a year. This does not fall within the scope of s. 7.10

The Court did not reach the question whether the directive was consistent
with the principles of fundamental justice.

III. ASSESSMENT
Thus, the Court upheld the adjudicator’s holding that the directive
was not a reasonable exercise of management rights, but, disagreeing
with the adjudicator, held that the directive did not even engage, much
less violate, the lawyers’ section 7 rights.11 There are two difficulties
with these holdings. First, the holding that the directive did not engage
section 7 is troubling. Second, the two holdings are inconsistent with
each other. In the particular context of this case, it is hard to see how the
employer’s exercise of its management rights could be unreasonable if
section 7 was not engaged or, conversely, how that exercise of
management rights could be reasonable if section 7 was engaged.
1. The Section 7 Liberty Interest
As noted above, the Court expressed some doubt as to whether
section 7 applied at all in this context, commenting that “[t]he extent to
which s. 7 of the Charter applies outside the context of the
administration of justice has yet to be settled in this Court …”.12 This
10

Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at paras. 50-51.
The adjudicator’s interpretation of the collective agreement is reviewed on the standard of
reasonableness. The court does not discuss the standard of review applicable to the adjudicator’s
constitutional reasoning, but appears to review it for correctness. In light of the subsequent decision in Law
Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.), the
appropriate standard would appear to be reasonableness.
12
Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 49.
11
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hesitancy is odd. Section 7 applies whenever legislation or other state
action affects life, liberty or security of the person, regardless of the
extent to which the state action in question involves “the administration
of justice”.13 The most significant cases of recent years illustrate the
point. In Bedford, the Supreme Court of Canada invalidated certain
provisions of the Criminal Code concerning sex work;14 in Carter, the
Court invalidated the provision of the Code prohibiting assisted suicide.
In both cases, the Charter applicants argued that the provisions in
question were unconstitutional not because their rights were violated
when they were alleged to have violated these provisions, but because
their rights were violated when they complied with them. And so the
constitutional arguments in these cases focused not on issues
characteristic of the administration of justice (jurisdiction,15 procedural
fairness,16 mens rea requirements,17 and so forth) but on the effect of the
provisions on the lives of people who were trying to comply with the law
while carrying on a lawful economic activity (Bedford) or struggling
with a debilitating disease (Carter). Thus, the connection between the
constitutional arguments in these cases and the administration of justice
was tenuous at best.
But the Court did not base its decision on the question of whether
section 7 applied; instead, the Court assumed that it did, but held that it was
not engaged because the directive requiring each employee to be available
outside working hours one to three weeks in the year did not affect any
decision of fundamental personal importance. This reasoning misses the
point of the union’s argument and of the adjudicator’s decision. The claim
was not that the directive affected any personal choice in particular; it was
that it affected private life in general, and therefore all the choices —
regardless of where they fell on the spectrum between importance and
triviality — that an employee might make. Having free time is essential to
one’s ability to develop and practice those activities one thinks of as
important, whatever they may be; and so, a law that interfered with one’s
time to the extent of substantially impeding one’s opportunities to develop
one’s interests (whatever they might be) would surely be subject to section 7
13

See Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2, and among the cases, see
particularly Carter.
14
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] S.C.J. No. 72, 2013 SCC 72 (S.C.C.).
15
For example, R. v. Moriarity, [2015] S.C.J. No. 55, 2015 SCC 55 (S.C.C.).
16
For example, R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.).
17
For example, R. v. Morrison, [2017] O.J. No. 3600, 2017 ONCA 582 (Ont. C.A.), appeal heard
and reserved May 24, 2018, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 290 (S.C.C.).
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scrutiny. A law that affected family bonds has already been recognized as
engaging section 7,18 and more generally decisions about private life —
whom to marry or partner with, whether to have children and how to raise
them, how to develop and maintain the affective bonds that are necessary
elements of personal life — are obvious candidates for protection under this
branch of the liberty interest. State action that significantly restricts the time
available for the development of one’s personal interests and interpersonal
bonds should be recognized as engaging the section 7 liberty interest, not
because it affects any personal choice in particular, but because it affects the
possibility of making these choices at all. Even if the section 7 liberty
interest does not protect the decision to engage in any particular activity, it
surely does protect the exercise of the capacity to engage in activities in
general; if not, legislation or other state action could indirectly restrict those
fundamental life choices that have already been recognized as directly
engaging the liberty interest by, for example, requiring everyone to be
available to serve the state’s purposes every evening and weekend.
If this line of argument is correct, the Court’s holding that section 7
was not engaged might nevertheless be supported on a slightly different
basis. The Court might be read as holding that the directive’s interference
with the liberty interest was not sufficiently substantial to attract
section 7 scrutiny. It is well established that trivial interferences with the
liberty interest do not engage section 7.19 And although Karakatsanis J.
does not put it that way, her repeated emphasis on the limited time
commitment involved (availability after hours for “two to three weeks a
year”20) suggests that that is what she had in mind.
But, whatever one’s views about the impact of the directive on
decisions of fundamental personal importance, there is a more
straightforward and compelling argument that the directive engaged the
lawyers’ liberty interest — an argument that was not made before
the Supreme Court of Canada and appears not to have been raised in the
proceedings below either. The directive limited the lawyers’ freedom of
movement by requiring them to remain within a certain radius of their
office for a certain period of time. Freedom of movement within Canada
is a well-recognized aspect of the liberty interest. State action that
prevents a person from moving about engages the liberty interest.
Offence definitions, recognizances, court orders, and temporary security
18
New Brunswick (Minister of Heath and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.).
19
See Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2(D)(5)(c).
20
Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 51.
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zones have all been recognized as engaging section 7 on this basis.21
Moreover, state action that requires a person to appear at a certain place
and time engage the liberty interest.22 And so a law or other government
action that required all the residents of Quebec City, or even some proper
subset of them, to remain in the city for a specific period of time would
undoubtedly affect those residents’ liberty interests and would have to be
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice in order to comply
with section 7. The directive had just this effect on the lawyers’ freedom
of movement. It therefore directly engaged the section 7 liberty interest.
2. Section 7 in the Context of Government Employment
The next step in a section 7 claim is to determine whether the effect
on the liberty interest is consistent with the principles of fundamental
justice. The adjudicator found that the directive was overbroad because
there were other ways for the employer to achieve its objective;23 and he
also noted that “it is difficult to conclude otherwise in the absence of
consent from [the employee], either in the form of a clear and precise
availability clause or voluntarily in exchange for some form of return
from the employer.”24 In other words, the directive would have been
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice if it was a
reasonable implementation of a clause that dealt specifically with
overtime or had otherwise been bargained for. But that is precisely the
same question, in constitutional guise, as the question whether the
issuance of the directive was a reasonable exercise of the employer’s
management rights.
21
R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761, at 789 (S.C.C.) (offence
definition); Ogden Entertainment Services v. Retail, Wholesale/Canada Canadian Service Sector Division
of the United Steelworkers of America, Local 440, [1998] O.J. No. 1769, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 340 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) (striking workers impeding traffic, though the Charter probably did not apply to them); R. v. Budreo,
[2000] O.J. No. 72, 142 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at para. 23 (Ont. C.A.) (recognizance); Tremblay c. Quebec
(Procureur général), [2001] J.Q. no 1504, at para. 47 (Que. C.S.) (temporary security perimeter during
international meeting); Baril v. Obelnicki, [2007] M.J. No. 110, 2007 MBCA 40, at para. 69 (Man. C.A.)
(court order, made under provincial legislation, restricting a person’s movements). See also Sahaluk v.
Alberta (Transportation Safety Board), [2017] A.J. No. 499, 2017 ABCA 153 (Alta. C.A.), which is
difficult to understand except on the assumption that limitations on the freedom to drive, as a particular
form of the freedom to move about, can under some circumstances engage the s. 7 liberty interest.
22
R. v. Tinker, [2017] O.J. No. 3435, 2017 ONCA 552, at para. 70 (Ont. C.A.), appeal heard and
reserved April 15, 2018, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 371 (S.C.C.); Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal
Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, 2004 SCC 42, at para. 67 (S.C.C.).
23
Decision, supra, note 1, para. 66.
24
Decision, id., para. 69.

302

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

In the context of an employment relationship, the legal basis for the
employer’s direction of an employee’s movements is the employee’s
agreement to be directed, through a contract of employment or a
collective agreement. Direction in accordance with the contract of
employment or collective agreement is lawful because it is authorized by
agreement; direction that is not in accordance with the contract of
employment or collective agreement violates the agreement. The Charter
does not, of course, apply to private employers, and it is tempting to
think that the Charter does not apply to the government either when it
acts purely as an employer. Tempting, but unnecessary: for when the
government is the employer, it is arguable that it is a principle of
fundamental justice that the employer can affect the employee’s liberty
interests only in accordance with the contract of employment. This
principle meets the three criteria for recognition as a principle of
fundamental justice: it is a legal principle; it is sufficiently precise; and it
is deeply embedded in our legal order, specifically in the law of
employment.25
This principle of fundamental justice would in general overlap with
the relevant employment law issues. For example, in St. Peter’s Health
System v. CUPE, Local 778,26 the question was whether a policy of
universal vaccination was authorized by the collective agreement. The
arbitration board found that the policy was not authorized by the
collective agreement. The board went on to say that compulsory
vaccination would be forced medical treatment, which would engage the
section 7 interest in security of the person,27 and then noted that such a
policy could have been imposed by statute or bargained for.28 The
unstated conclusion is that the policy would then not only have been
authorized by the collective agreement but would have been consistent
with the principles of fundamental justice and therefore with section 7.
Similarly, on the facts of Assn. of Justice Counsel, it is very hard to
see how the issuance of the directive could both be reasonable and
violate the lawyers’ section 7 rights; or, on the other hand, how it could
25
On the criteria for identifying a principle of fundamental justice, see Stewart, Fundamental
Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2B(3), and for a recent application of this test from the Supreme Court of
Canada, see Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7,
2015 SCC 7 (S.C.C.).
26
St. Peter’s Health System v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 778 (Flu Vaccination
Grievance), [2002] O.L.A.A. No. 164, 106 L.A.C. (4th) 170 (Ont. Lab. Arb.) [hereinafter “St. Peter’s
Health System”].
27
Compare Stewart, Fundamental Justice, supra, note 5, Chapter 2D(4)(a)).
28
St. Peter’s Health System, supra, note 26, at 192.
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be unreasonable without violating the lawyers’ section 7 rights. If the
directive was authorized by the collective agreement, then the lawyers
had consented to it via the collective bargaining process and, although it
affected their liberty interest, that effect would accord with the principles
of fundamental justice; but if the directive was not authorized by the
collective Agreement, then that effect would violate the principle. To
apply the relevant principle of fundamental justice is to answer the same
question that the adjudicator decided.29

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court’s holding, in Assn. of Justice Counsel, that the directive at
issue did not engage the section 7 liberty interest is unsatisfactory. It
unnecessarily constrains the possible development of the branch of the
liberty interest that is concerned with decisions of fundamental personal
importance and it does not fit well with the Court’s holding that the
adjudicator’s decision that the directive at issue was not authorized by
the collective agreement was reasonable. If the adjudicator’s decision
was reasonable, and if section 7 applied at all to the government as
employer, then it would have been much more plausible to say that the
directive did indeed engage the liberty interest and was not consistent
with the principles of fundamental justice because it was not authorized
by the collective agreement.

29
In her dissent, Côté J. describes the majority’s position as “contradictory”, on the ground that
the erroneous s. 7 analysis was so important to the adjudicator’s decision that it tainted the rest of the
decision; she is particularly puzzled as to how the majority could conclude that the s. 7 liberty interest was
not engaged and yet find reasonable the adjudicator’s decision that the directive had a significant effect on
the lawyers’ personal lives: Assn. of Justice Counsel, supra, note 1, at para. 57. I am suggesting that on the
facts of the case, the two questions are indistinguishable.

